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“Lo cierto es que no sé qué dirección tomará la Administración”, reconoce Mundy

Beatriz Pascual Macías
20 de mayo de 2021

Washington, 20 may (EFE).- Tras cuatro meses de silencio, el presidente de EE.UU., Joe Biden, afronta mayor presión internacional y doméstica para aclarar si mantendrá el acuerdo de su antecesor, Donald Trump, con el que Washington reconoció la soberanía de Marruecos sobre el Sáhara Occidental a cambio de una normalización de relaciones con Israel.

El mandatario ha recibido presión para tomar una decisión por parte de senadores demócratas y republicanos, así como de poderosos grupos de presión proisraelíes. Además, algunos de sus aliados en Europa, como Madrid y Berlín, atraviesan ahora crisis diplomáticas sin precedentes con Marruecos.

Pese a todo, el Departamento de Estado repite lo mismo que lleva diciendo desde que Biden llegó a la Casa Blanca el 20 de enero pasado.

La línea oficial es “no se ha tomado ninguna decisión” y se está realizando una revisión de la política de Washington hacia esa parte del mundo, como se ha hecho con Corea del Norte o con Cuba.

“Estamos haciendo consultas en privado con las partes sobre el mejor camino a seguir y no tenemos nada más que anunciar”, se limitó a decir a Efe un funcionario del Departamento de Estado, que habló bajo condición de anonimato.

El silencio es lo que predomina en este asunto, aunque hace dos semanas el portal Axios informó de que, durante una llamada, el secretario de Estado, Antony Blinken, había dicho a su homólogo marroquí, Nasser Bourita, que por el momento no tenía previsto revertir la decisión de Trump.

En ese momento, la respuesta del Departamento de Estado fue la misma: estamos revisando esta política y aquí no hay nada que ver.

Sin embargo, en opinión de varios analistas, Washington no podrá mantener ese silencio durante mucho tiempo y está abocado a decidir entre tres posibilidades.

TRES POSIBLES ESCENARIOS

La primera opción que tiene Biden es dar marcha atrás y volver al “statu quo” antes de Trump, es decir, no reconocer la soberanía marroquí sobre los territorios que ocupa desde 1975 en la antigua colonia española del Sáhara Occidental, considerada por la ONU un territorio no autónomo en proceso de autodeterminación.

Otra opción sería mantener el reconocimiento a la soberanía marroquí, pero condicionarlo a progresos diplomáticos para resolver el conflicto, explicó a Efe Jacob Mundy, profesor de la Universidad Colgate en el estado de Nueva York.

El tercer escenario sería mantener la proclamación presidencial de Trump, pero no tomar ninguna decisión que la “haga realidad”. Por ejemplo, Biden podría negarse a destinar fondos a la apertura de un consulado estadounidense en el Sáhara Occidental, tal y como había anunciado su antecesor.

“Lo cierto es que no sé qué dirección tomará la Administración”, reconoce Mundy.

¿SILENCIO DURANTE CUÁNTO TIEMPO?

El mutis actual de EE.UU., sin embargo, es “insostenible” porque podría tener consecuencias nefastas para la estabilidad del norte de África, tal y como muestra la situación en Ceuta, dijo a Efe Riccardo Fabiani, director del International Crisis Group para esa región.

“Lo que está pasando en Ceuta muestra muy bien que si dejas el problema sin tratar, al final ese problema vuelve y hay consecuencias”, argumentó Fabiani.

Especialmente preocupante para Washington podría ser la actitud de Marruecos, que ha vivido unas duras horas de tensión con España después de la llegada a la ciudad española de Ceuta de más de 8.000 migrantes; mientras el líder del Frente Polisario, Brahim Gali, recibe atención médica en España.

Además, Marruecos mantiene un pulso diplomático con Berlín y ha suspendido todos sus contactos con la embajada alemana en Rabat aparentemente por desacuerdos sobre el Sáhara Occidental.

Para el investigador del Real Instituto Elcano, Haizam Amirah Fernández, el “envalentonamiento” de Marruecos es consecuencia de las concesiones de Trump a Rabat.

PRESIONES DE TODOS LADOS

A esas dificultades, se suma la presión interna que Biden ha recibido por parte del principal grupo proisraelí en EE.UU., AIPAC, que teme que un cambio de postura de Washington sobre el estatus del Sáhara Occidental lleve a Rabat revocar su reconocimiento de Israel como Estado.

Frente a ello, un grupo de 27 senadores -13 republicanos y 14 demócratas- enviaron en febrero una carta a Biden para que revirtiera la “decisión equivocada” de Trump y renovar su compromiso con un referéndum para determinar el futuro de la antigua colonia española.

Otros actores que han ejercido presión sobre Biden son los legisladores de origen cubano que se oponen al apoyo que Cuba presta a la República Árabe Saharaui Democrática (RASD) y, por tanto, suelen apoyar a Marruecos.

Por ejemplo, varios integrantes del “caucus” que defiende los intereses de Marruecos en el Congreso de EE.UU. son legisladores de origen cubano, como el republicano Mario Díaz Balart.

(c) Agencia EFE

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Western Sahara’s moment in the sun – IRIN News

Western Sahara’s moment in the sun
How the UN chief waded into a forgotten conflict with no end in sight
By Annie Slemrod, Middle East Editor
JERUSALEM, 14 April 2016
http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/04/14/western-sahara%E2%80%99s-moment-sun

Of all of the world’s forgotten conflicts (and there are plenty), that of Western Sahara, with its refugees tucked away in a remote desert, ranks as one of the most consigned to oblivion.

But last month, the world’s top diplomat, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, brought the issue to temporary attention with a rather undiplomatic move. After visiting part of the disputed territory, which is claimed by both Morocco and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front, he called Morocco’s presence there an “occupation.”

What counts as chaos in the land of diplomacy ensued: Morocco angrily ordered civilian members of a UN peacekeeping force out; there were meetings in the UN Security Council that amounted to little and no joint expression of support for the secretary-general; and finally a spokesman tried to walk back Ban’s comments, saying it had all been a “misunderstanding” born of his “spontaneous, personal reaction” to the situation of the Sahrawi refugees.

“Without meaning to do so, Ban has awoken a sleeping dog,” Marina Ottoway, senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center think tank, said of the secretary-general’s actions.

But does that mean there could finally be progress in resolving one of the world’s most intractable conflicts, one that has rumbled on largely unnoticed for more than 40 years?

Here’s a look at the long-neglected Western Sahara dispute and the Sahrawi refugees stuck in the middle.
What is Western Sahara?

Western Sahara’s 266,000 square kilometres formed a Spanish colony from the late 19th century until the mid-1970s. Morocco claims the territory as its own, but no country officially recognises its sovereignty and it is countered by the Polisario Front, which has a government-in-exile in Algeria and the backing of many of the indigenous Sahrawi people.

When Spain washed its hands of the area in 1975, a war between Morocco and the Polisarios ensued. In the 1980s, Morocco built a 1,500-kilometre long wall through the territory, placing 82 percent on its side and separating many families.

By the time a 1991 UN-brokered ceasefire brought quiet as well as peacekeepers in the form of MINURSO, tens of thousands of Sahrawis had been displaced by the fighting. Most live in five Polisario Front-administered camps in Tindouf, Algeria, on the edge of the 18 percent of the territory that the Polisario Front considers “liberated”, and the international community tends to call a no-man’s land.

There’s no official count of how many Sahrawi refugees live in the camps – the Polisario Front and Algeria put it at 165,000 and the UN tends to base its needs assessments on an estimate of around 90,000.

Some live in tents, others in mud brick homes. They are extremely vulnerable to inclement weather – in October 2015 more than 17,000 homes were destroyed or severely damaged in flooding that affected both sides of the wall.

There are almost no employment opportunities for the Sahrawis in Tindouf, and almost all rely on aid to survive, although conditions are said to be significantly better on the Moroccan side because of the country’s investment in development there.

Human rights groups regularly report on Morocco’s heavy-handed way of dealing with Sahrawi dissidents, and there is concern that the Polisario Front does not tolerate dissent particularly well either.

What do the parties want?

The 1991 ceasefire was meant to be followed by an independence referendum, and MINURSO set about compiling a voter roll in the 1990s. But deciding who had the right to vote on the territory’s fate became a Sisyphean task, as throughout the 1990s Morocco had moved many new residents into the area and both sides objected to various counts.

By the time MINURSO came up with a list– reportedly kept in Geneva for safekeeping – the possibility of a referendum actually taking place had become remote. A new plan by former UN special envoy James Baker, which included independence as one option in a vote that would take place after a period of autonomy, was rejected by Morocco and he resigned in 2004 out of frustration with, among other issues, the Security Council’s refusal to implement a plan it had approved.

The Polisario Front still wants some sort of vote on independence, but most experts see this as an unlikely prospect.

“You will never be able to determine who is entitled to vote in that referendum,” explained Ottoway.

Morocco is fine with that, as their current proposal is that Western Sahara has some form of local governance akin to that of any other region, as part of a larger decentralisation plan. This would give the territory no special status.
What next?

Both groups have proved intransigent in negotiations, and the UN has utterly failed at moving the process forward.

Part of the problem is that it’s an easy place for major powers to ignore. “Looked at from Washington, Morocco and Algeria fighting over the Western Sahara is like two bald men fighting over a comb,” said Ottoway.

It’s true that the conflict is usually low in intensity. But there are occasional flare-ups: at least five people were killed in 2010 when Moroccan security forces broke up a Saharawi protest camp.

From another perspective, Western Sahara is left on the sidelines not because it is small and remote, but because it has in fact become a pawn in global politics.

As Jacob Mundy, an assistant professor at Colgate University and an expert on the conflict pointed out, Morocco has positioned itself as a key ally of Saudi Arabia and the West in North Africa, sharing intelligence with the United States and even playing host to at least one of the CIA’s controversial black sites. This brings the US closely into line with France, already staunchly on Morocco’s in the dispute.

“Anytime Morocco is feeling the pressure on Western Sahara, they probably find ways of making themselves very useful to the United States,” Mundy explained.

On Algeria’s side, three current UN Security Council members have officially recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, the Polisario Front’s government-in-exile: Angola, Uruguay and Venezuela.

“The real issue is whether or not any country on the Security Council is going to expend political chips on the issue of Western Sahara,” Baker said, shortly after his resignation back in 2004. “That’s what makes this so difficult; because the profile of the issue is so very low and they’re not going to want to risk alienating either Morocco, on the one hand, or Algeria, on the other, by taking a firm position. And they’re not willing to ask either or one or both of the parties to do something they don’t want to do.”

Anna Theofilopoulou, an independent political analyst who was part Baker’s team, believes diplomacy over Western Sahara does need some shaking up but that Ban’s move was the wrong one.

Reportedly denied the right to land in Morocco, the UN chief only met with Sahrawi refugees, the Polisario Front, and Algeria. Then he used the word occupation.

“You don’t use the big guns unless you know that you are going to get good results,” Theofilopoulou told IRIN. “That’s one basic rule of diplomacy.”

While we shouldn’t have any illusions about whether Ban’s move will change a conflict that has been stubbornly unmoving for decades, there is a slim chance of an opening ahead.

MINURSO’s mandate is up for its yearly renewal at the end of April, and while that will likely be a rubber stamp, this might be a good occasion for Ban to point out that the Security Council’s refusal or inability to force meaningful action has had serious consequences, not least in the form of a generation of refugees who have been born and grew up in tents.

“I think maybe this is time for the secretariat to play hardball,” Theofilopoulou said, suggesting that Ban should apply pressure on the Security Council.

Mundy is of a similar mind. “It would be interesting if the secretariat just dropped it in the Security Council’s lap and said, ‘you guys refuse to take a firm position and also expect the mediators to work. What do you expect?’”

But with France and the United States permanent members of the Security Council, it’s unlikely we’ll see any significant shift any time soon. And there is also no guarantee that stepping up international involvement would bring any greater peace or lead to a durable solution.

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El Watan (Algiers) : « Le Maroc est la cause de l’impasse actuelle »

«Le Maroc est la cause de l’impasse actuelle»
A la une International
Jacob Mundy. Spécialiste des conflits et enseignant à l’université Colgate (Etats-Unis)

le 14.04.16

Inscrit depuis 1966 sur la liste des territoires non autonomes — et donc éligible à l’application de la résolution 1514 de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU portant déclaration sur l’octroi de l’indépendance aux pays et peuples coloniaux —, le Sahara occidental est la dernière colonie en Afrique, occupé depuis 1975 par le Maroc qui est soutenu par la France. Jacob Mundy, enseignant à l’université Colgate de New York, explique les raisons des récentes attaques dirigées par le Maroc contre le secrétaire général de l’ONU.

– Les relations entre le Maroc et les Nations unies se sont considérablement détériorées depuis la visite, en mars, de Ban Ki-moon dans les camps de réfugiés sahraouis. Vous attendiez-vous à une telle situation ?

J’ai été surpris de voir le secrétaire général de l’ONU afficher ouvertement une pareille hostilité à l’égard du Maroc. La source de cette hostilité est bien connue. Durant des années, le Maroc a refusé de travailler avec son envoyé personnel pour le Sahara occidental, l’ambassadeur Christopher Ross. Dans le passé, le secrétariat a montré certains signes de frustration, mais cela est resté discret et gardé sous silence.

Quand le Maroc a décidé de bloquer la visite de Ban Ki-moon dans les territoires (cela inclut aussi le refus d’accorder à son avion l’autorisation d’atterrir à El Ayoun), ce fut la goutte de trop… le coup final. En affichant sa frustration publiquement, le secrétaire général de l’ONU a créé un précédent. De Waldheim à Annan, les secrétaires généraux de l’ONU ont généralement été plus favorables au Maroc qu’au Front Polisario.

– Que pensez-vous des raisons invoquées par le Maroc pour essayer de disqualifier Ban Ki-moon et l’approche de l’ONU du conflit ?

Les Marocains n’aiment pas entendre la vérité à propos du Sahara occidental. La vérité est que le Sahara occidental est le dernier territoire non autonome d’Afrique. De plus : selon les documents de l’ONU, l’Espagne est officiellement la puissance administrante. Donc, si l’Espagne est la puissance administrante et que le Sahara occidental est non autonome, alors quel est le statut légal du Maroc dans ce territoire ? Cela ne peut être autre chose qu’une occupation.

Ban Ki-moon a dit la vérité quand il a défini la situation comme une occupation. L’Assemblée générale de l’ONU a aussi qualifié la situation d’occupation. L’avis légal émis en 2002 par les Nations unies sur la question est aussi clair. En fait, quand Ban Ki-moon a qualifié le Sahara occidental de «territoire occupé», il a parlé simplement d’un fait reconnu comme tel par la loi internationale.

– Comment décryptez-vous la décision du Maroc d’expulser les membres de la composante politique de la Minurso ? Quel message le roi Mohammed VI a-t-il voulu délivrer ?

Le Maroc a toujours eu une relation inconfortable avec la Minurso. Tout d’abord, le nom de la mission onusienne reconnaît que sa vocation est d’organiser un référendum d’autodétermination. Le cessez-le-feu n’était pas le but principal de cette mission. Il ne s’agissait là que d’une étape dans le processus devant mener à l’organisation d’un référendum sur l’indépendance.

Le Maroc s’en est quand même accommodé. Le cessez-le-feu et les observateurs militaires onusiens le long de la berme sont devenus très utiles pour Rabat. Le Maroc sait que beaucoup de Sahraouis veulent que le Polisario reprenne la guerre. Rabat utilise donc les forces de maintien de la paix de la Minurso pour garder un œil sur le Polisario et dissuader les Sahraouis de se lancer dans une nouvelle lutte armée.

Cependant, l’administration civile de la Minurso est un problème pour le Maroc vu la pression internationale grandissante en faveur de la surveillance des droits de l’homme dans les territoires occupés, surtout que la demande est soutenue par les gouvernements américain et britannique.

Si la Minurso est mandatée pour surveiller les droits de l’homme, ce sera forcément ses administrateurs civils qui se chargeront d’accomplir la mission. A certains égards, la Minurso a déjà surveillé les droits de l’homme de façon informelle. Le Maroc a donc fait une action préventive destinée à empêcher la Minurso de surveiller les droits de l’homme.

– Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité (CPS) de l’Union africaine (UA) vient de se dire «inquiet» au sujet de la situation dans la région. Pour l’UA, la décision du Maroc d’expulser les membres de la composante politique de la Minurso «menace la sécurité régionale». Partagez-vous la même inquiétude ? Pensez-vous que la situation pourrait un jour dégénérer si rien n’est fait pour résoudre ce vieux conflit ?

Je partage les préoccupations de l’UA. Les tensions ne cessent d’augmenter au Sahara occidental. Néanmoins, il est peu probable que le Front Polisario se lance, dans un avenir proche, dans une guerre et cela par respect pour l’Algérie qui se débat avec la question de l’«après-Bouteflika». Le Maroc, quant à lui, attend tout simplement l’élection d’un nouveau président aux Etats-Unis. Il espère une deuxième Administration Clinton qui signifiera probablement le soutien total des Etats-Unis pour «l’autonomie».

Mais si le Maroc et le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies continuent à fermer toutes les issues qui conduisent concrètement vers un référendum, il est difficile d’imaginer qu’il n’y aura pas de manifestations du conflit. Cela sous une forme ou une autre. Après, AQMI et Daech pourraient tirer profit d’une telle situation, comme ils l’ont déjà fait au Mali.

– Pourquoi le Conseil de sécurité n’a pas condamné l’attitude agressive du Maroc envers le secrétaire général de l’ONU, comme cela a été demandé par Ban Ki-moon lui-même ? Comment le Maroc peut-il se permettre de défier ainsi la communauté internationale ?

La réponse est simple : c’est la France. Le gouvernement français a toujours soutenu le Maroc au sein du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU. La France est au Maroc ce que les Etats-Unis sont à Israël. Quand il y avait un consensus total sur le plan Baker en 2003 — qui aurait pu résoudre ce conflit en 2010 —, la France avait sonné la charge et s’y était opposée. Depuis lors, le Maroc ne cesse de se sentir conforté et renforcé dans son attitude. Ban Ki-moon est également sur le point de terminer son mandat. En France et aux Etats-Unis, le Maroc est plus important qu’un secrétaire général sortant.

– Qu’est-ce qui empêche concrètement le règlement du conflit du Sahara occidental, conformément aux résolutions pertinentes des Nations unies ?

Les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU appellent actuellement une solution politique négociée qui permettra un référendum d’autodétermination au Sahara occidental. Le Polisario est prêt à discuter de l’autonomie dans le contexte d’une solution politique qui équivaudrait au final au vote d’un statut définitif. Cependant, le Maroc estime que sa proposition d’autonomie avancée en 2007 est la solution optimale, même si elle ne prévoit pas de référendum d’autodétermination.

C’est le Maroc qui a généré l’impasse. Mais le Conseil de sécurité ne veut pas mettre de pression sur le Maroc. Et cela, même pas au plan du discours. Comme nous l’avons vu durant les derniers événements, le Maroc est prêt à tout pour parvenir à ses fins, y compris exploiter comme il l’a fait un événement sans conséquence (visite de Ban Ki-moon) ou créer une crise régionale.

– A votre avis, que devons-nous attendre de la prochaine réunion du Conseil de sécurité sur le conflit du Sahara occidental ?

Le rapport du secrétaire général de l’ONU a été retardé. Il semble donc qu’il y ait actuellement des tractations et un intense travail de coulisses. Il n’en sortira probablement pas grand-chose. La dernière fois que nous avons assisté à une levée de boucliers du Maroc concernant la surveillance des droits de l’homme dans les territoires sahraouis occupés, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU avait fini par trouver le moyen de le calmer. Un processus similaire est probablement en cours.

Bio express

Spécialiste du Maghreb, Jacob Mundy anime actuellement un cours sur la paix et les conflits à l’université Colgate de New York. Il a particulièrement travaillé sur les conflits armés et les interventions humanitaires en Afrique du Nord, une région où il a séjourné de nombreuses fois.

Jacob Mundy a publié des articles très fouillés sur le conflit sahraoui dans plusieurs revues spécialisées. Le dernier remonte à 2014 et est intitulé «Sahara occidental : La résistance non violente comme dernier recours». Il a été coécrit avec Stephen Zune. Jacob Mundy est diplômé des universités d’Exeter et de Seattle.

Zine Cherfaoui

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Vice News : Morocco Boots UN Diplomats Over Western Sahara Spat

Morocco Boots UN Diplomats Over Western Sahara Spat
Kayla Ruble
March 18, 2016
https://news.vice.com/article/morocco-boots-un-diplomats-over-western-sahara-spat

Morocco’s government and the Polisario Front liberation movement have been locked in a territorial dispute over Western Sahara for decades. Progress toward a solution has stagnated in recent years as the international community attempts to balance between the two sides, but controversial comments from the United Nations’ top official have sparked an unusually tense diplomatic spat.

The controversy kicked off last week when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon visited refugee camps in Algeria where more than 100,000 indigenous Sahrawi people reside, many of whom fled Western Sahara decades ago. These camps are the base for the Polisario and the wider independence movement for Western Sahara, which has long pushed for Morocco to give up control of the territory that lies along Africa’s northwestern Atlantic coast and abuts Mauritania and Algeria.

Ban, however, did not meet with Moroccan authorities during the visit, as is typically expected by diplomats in order to appease both sides. Following the visit, Ban said the UN would work toward achieving a solution in the conflict. The UN chief referred to the Moroccan presence in Western Sahara, which Morocco took control of after Western Sahara gained independence from Spain in 1975, as an “occupation.”

This set off a series of condemnations by Morocco, with the government taking a strong stance as a result of the comments. Morocco said Ban’s statement’s indicated that he had abandoned his neutral position in the dispute and sided with the Polisario. While the UN confirmed that Ban did use the word occupation, they said the meaning was misinterpreted and that it was said in the context of the UN chief’s reaction to the situation in the camps.

A demonstration in the Moroccan capital Rabat on Sunday saw thousands gather in the streets to protest the secretary general. As the situation escalated this week, the country initially said it would cut down on staff at the UN mission in Western Sahara (formally called the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, or MINURSO), while also threatening recall its troops participating in peacekeeping operations around the world.

“Following the unacceptable declarations and inadmissible actions from the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon during his recent visit to the region, the royal government of Morocco has decided on immediate measures,” the statement from the government said.

As the situation deteriorated, Ban cancelled a planned trip to Morocco. Eventually officials in Rabat backed down on Thursday, saying they would no longer move to withdraw its troops from global UN missions. But on Thursday, Morocco gave a three-day warning to 84 international UN civilian staff members to get out of Western Sahara, including three from the African Union. According to a UN secretariat spokesman, these actions “would seriously impede the functioning of MINURSO and negatively impact on its ability to deliver its mandate.”

After 16 years of fighting between Morocco and the Polisario Front, which has continuously sought to gain independence, the situation peaked in 1991 when the two sides finally signed a UN-brokered ceasefire and the peacekeeping mission known as MINURSO was established.

The most optimistic point in the conflict came in the early 2000s when former US Secretary of State James Baker, the UN’s personal envoy to Western Sahara at the time, attempted to push through a peace plan that included the option for self-determination by the Sahrawi people. Morocco ultimately rejected this plan in 2004, largely due to the option for independence. Just months later Baker resigned.

Since then the situation has been stuck in a stalemate. Popular uprisings took hold in 2011 as the Arab Spring protest movements spread through North Africa and the Middle East, but failed to incite any major changes. Moroccan authorities are routinely accused of human rights abuses against the Sahrawi in Western Sahara, including arbitrary arrest, torture, and restrictions on freedom of speech. Tensions heightened during the past two years after Morocco refused to accept the appointment of a new UN personal envoy to Western Sahara.

For the secretary-general, these tensions appear to have helped fuel continued frustration towards Morocco and the visit may have been an attempt to show Western Sahara that the international body has not forgotten about the issue, according to Jacob Mundy, a political science professor and North Africa expert at Colgate University. As Mundy noted, the visit was unusual in the fact that Ban only met with one side.

“It’s kind of unprecedented, just on its face, only going to meet with one side of the conflict,” he said. “The secretariat has never visibly shown this much frustration before and if it was… it never would have made its frustration public.”

As Mundy noted, even when the Baker plan was rejected, the secretary general did not express this kind of outward displeasure or frustration. While it’s difficult to say what the threats from Morocco mean, Mundy said he expects efforts to be made to try to repair the relationship before the annual referendum vote at the end of April to reaffirm the UN mission’s mandate.

Anna Theofilopoulou, a political analyst and former UN staffer who assisted Baker during the peace plan proposal process, questioned the decision to not sit down with Moroccan authorities during the visit. Theofilopoulou wondered why the UN chief felt the need to travel to Western Sahara given the relative impasse in recent years.

“In my whole career in the United Nations I just never witnessed such an ill-advised movement, quite bluntly,” she said. “I don’t know what [they] advised him and what were they thinking… did anybody look to the background of this conflict?”

While addressing the issue of the refugees living in Algeria is important, Theofilopoulou said that by making the visit the the secretary general was essentially walking into a pit of vipers — referring to Moroccan officials. As she explained, the situation in general is a tense one for the country, but furthermore Morocco is known for having the ability to overreact to these kind of diplomatic developments or when something doesn’t go their way.

Earlier this year, Morocco pushed back against the European Union after a court for the governing body blocked a farm trade deal with Morocco, ruling that goods from the occupied territories of Western Sahara should not be included in the agriculture trade agreement. Morocco subsequently cut communications with the EU, which later pushed the court to reverse its decision. Just this week, Morocco decided to warm up to Europe again after a visit from the bloc’s foreign policy chief helped to smooth things over.

“Morocco does respond to pressure if they realize there’s no way out,” she said. “It’s gone from bad to worse and I don’t know what on earth they’re thinking in the UN. How do they think this is going to end?”

Theofilopoulou speculated that Morocco will not work effectively with the UN until Ban’s term is up this year. Both she and Mundy also said that the kingdom is likely waiting for the results in the US presidential election this fall to make any significant moves. The US is one of Morocco’s key allies — along with France — with ties to former secretary of state and presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and the Clinton Foundation.

Regardless, with the peacekeeping mission in the spotlight, Mundy said it will be important to watch whether the UN seriously considers rethinking MINURSO’s role in the Western Sahara dispute and the peace process as a whole.”Since Baker resigned in 2004. It’s really been negotiations for the sake of negotiations [with] very little momentum [and] backwards progress from the kind of advancements made in late 1990s and early 2000s,” he explained. “One of the few tools the international community has left is the silent treatment really.”

Topics: africa, northern africa, western sahara, ban ki-moon, united nations, war & conflict, sahrawi, polisario front, algeria, morocco, occupation, peacekeeping mission, minurso

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«La Marche verte est la façade civile d’une invasion militaire»

Au grand dam des populations sahraouies représentées par le Front Polisario dès 1973, le Sahara occidental, ancienne colonie espagnole, est colonisé en 1975 par le Maroc. Hassan II y envoie, le 6 novembre, des Marocains pour l’envahir, avant de lancer une offensive armée contre les Sahraouis. L’attaque marocaine est même appuyée par des bombardements massifs. Le peuple sahraoui lutte depuis plus de 40 ans pour son droit à l’autodétermination. Dans les territoires sahraouis occupés par le Maroc, la vie des Sahraouis est marquée par la répression et le harcèlement constants. Le Sahara occidental est aujourd’hui la dernière colonie d’Afrique. Spécialiste des conflits au Maghreb, Jacob Mundy de l’université Colgate (New York) explique le stratagème mis en place par le roi Hassan II pour accaparer ce territoire.

– Cela fait maintenant 40 ans depuis que le Maroc a envahi le Sahara occidental. Pourquoi l’ONU n’arrive toujours pas à régler ce conflit conformément à la légalité internationale ?

Actuellement, l’Organisation des Nations unies a un double discours sur le Sahara occidental : le Conseil de sécurité appelle à la fois à une solution politique et à une solution qui respecte le droit du Sahara occidental à l’autodétermination, conformément au droit international. Ceci est une pure contradiction. Le Maroc rejette l’idée d’un référendum d’autodétermination, et ainsi le Conseil de sécurité a donné à Rabat un pouvoir de veto sur le processus de paix. Dès lors, pour le Front Polisario, la seule façon d’avancer serait de compromettre son droit à l’autodétermination et d’accepter cette injustice comme un fait accompli.

Mais pourquoi les Sahraouis renonceraient-ils à ce droit alors que le Maroc n’a pas fait une offre sérieuse d’une réelle autonomie ?

Cependant, je ne suis pas convaincu que les Nations unies puissent régler cette question, même si le Front Polisario se montre prêt à s’engager dans des négociations dans lesquelles l’option de l’indépendance ne serait pas à l’ordre du jour. Au fil du temps, le statut non résolu du conflit du Sahara occidental est devenu un élément central dans le fonctionnement du régime marocain sur le double plan intérieur et extérieur. Le Maroc se présente comme un modèle de stabilité dans une région instable du monde. Pourtant, comme nous le savons tous, cette stabilité est basée sur un fondement instable, le Sahara occidental.

La monarchie marocaine a utilisé la menace perpétuelle du Sahara occidental pour contrôler la politique intérieure marocaine et maintenir des alliances sécuritaires vitales avec Paris et Washington. Ces processus de «sécurité à travers l’insécurité» sont assez courants en géopolitique ; nous observons ces processus dans les relations-clés des États-Unis comme Israël, l’Arabie Saoudite et le Maroc.

– Pour quelle raison le Maroc refuse, à ce jour, au peuple sahraoui d’exercer son droit à l’autodétermination comme le recommandent pourtant un rapport de la Cour internationale de justice daté du 15 octobre 1975 et de nombreuses autres résolutions de l’ONU ?

Le Maroc refuse le déroulement d’un vote sur l’indépendance du Sahara occidental parce qu’il sera perdant. Cela était clair en 1975 lorsqu’une mission des Nations unies a visité le Sahara occidental et cela est clair aujourd’hui dans les camps de réfugiés et au Sahara occidental.

Les manifestations quotidiennes des Sahraouis qui vivent sous occupation montrent qu’il y a une forte majorité en faveur de l’indépendance. Après 40 ans d’occupation, le Maroc n’a pas réussi à gagner les cœurs et les esprits des Sahraouis. Le Maroc a tenté de gagner le vote dans les années 1990 en inondant l’électorat avec de faux Sahraouis. L’ONU n’a pas accepté cela. C’est la raison pour laquelle le Maroc parle maintenant d’autonomie, sachant qu’un vote légitime n’ira pas en sa faveur.

– D’après vous, pourquoi le roi Hassan II a-t-il organisé la Marche verte le 6 novembre 1975 ? Avait-il le droit d’envahir le Sahara occidental ? Cette marche était-elle pacifique comme le soutient le Maroc ?

Comme les historiens l’ont découvert, les plans marocains d’invasion du Sahara occidental avaient été préparés des années auparavant. Nous connaissons tous l’échec de la «guerre des sables» menée en 1963 par le Maroc contre l’Algérie. Ce qui est moins connu, c’est que Hassan II avait même un plan avancé pour envahir la Mauritanie.

En 1974, quand l’Espagne a annoncé son intention d’organiser un référendum sur l’indépendance du Sahara occidental, le Maroc a intensifié ses efforts diplomatiques en allant à l’ONU et en demandant l’avis de la Cour internationale de justice. Durant les audiences de la Cour, lors de l’été 1975, il était clair que les juges de la CIJ ne pouvaient pas prendre au sérieux les arguments juridiques avancés par le Maroc pour conquérir le Sahara occidental.

Le Maroc ne pouvait même pas démontrer sa souveraineté continue et effective sur le sud du Maroc (Oued Draa)… alors ne parlons pas du Sahara occidental. C’est comme cela que Hassan II a commencé à peaufiner ses plans d’invasion du Sahara occidental. Selon mes recherches, Henry Kissinger a été informé début octobre (deux semaines avant la publication de la décision de la CIJ) que le Maroc allait envahir le Sahara occidental.

Etant donné qu’une invasion militaire directe d’un Etat d’Europe occidentale allait être trop dangereuse, Hassan II a dû forcer l’Espagne à abandonner le Sahara occidental par d’autres moyens. Ainsi, l’idée ingénieuse de la «Marche verte» a été utilisée pour créer une façade civile pour une invasion militaire. Nous devons nous rappeler que la marche «pacifique» de Hassan II a été soutenue par une présence militaire massive dans le sud du Maroc. Hassan II a averti que si Madrid s’opposait à la Marche verte, le Maroc déclarerait la guerre à l’Espagne.

Cette sortie avait mis Madrid dans une situation impossible. Si Franco n’avait pas été en déclin, l’Espagne aurait peut-être résisté à la pression du Maroc. Mais comme les historiens espagnols le révèlent maintenant, l’agonie de Franco a créé une «guerre civile» dans le cabinet espagnol. En fin de compte, un accord secret a été conclu avec le Maroc fin octobre 1975. Dans les faits, l’invasion militaire par le Maroc de l’est de Saguia El Hamra a commencé les 30-31 octobre.

La Marche verte n’était devenue qu’un spectacle pour apaiser une opinion marocaine envahie par une frénésie nationaliste. Seuls quelques milliers de manifestants ont franchi la frontière du Sahara espagnol et… seulement de quelques kilomètres. La grande majorité des participants à la Marche verte est restée au Maroc compte tenu de l’accord conclu avec Madrid. Cela a permis aux deux parties de sauver la face : Hassan II a obtenu sa marche et l’Espagne a quitté le territoire selon ses propres termes.

– En août 1974, l’Espagne, qui souhaite se retirer du Sahara occidental, annonce l’organisation d’un référendum d’autodétermination pour 1975. Pourquoi Madrid a abandonné cette option et préféré ouvrir des négociations avec le Maroc et la Mauritanie ?

L’Espagne a été contrainte de négocier avec le Maroc et la Mauritanie parce qu’elle a été abandonnée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, principalement en raison de l’insistance française et américaine qui soutenait que le Maroc avait réussi son invasion. Lorsque la Marche verte a été annoncée, l’Espagne est allée au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU pour dénoncer l’acte marocain comme un acte menaçant la paix et la sécurité internationales. Le Conseil a été lent à réagir et, à la fin, il n’a jamais fait plus que dénoncer la Marche verte du Maroc. Et quand la dénonciation est venue, la marche avait déjà commencé.

L’Organisation des Nations unies, qui avait été principalement créée pour prévenir une agression dans les affaires mondiales, n’a rien fait pour arrêter l’agression du Maroc contre l’Espagne, ceci parce que Paris et Washington savaient qu’un échec de Hassan II dans la conquête du Sahara occidental marquerait la fin de la monarchie au Maroc.

– Comment voyez-vous aujourd’hui l’évolution du conflit ? De quoi dépend son règlement ?

Il est difficile de voir tout espoir dans le processus de paix de l’ONU maintenant que le Maroc a tenté de rejeter l’ambassadeur Christopher Ross comme envoyé personnel du secrétaire général de l’ONU pour le Sahara occidental. Maintenant, nous attendons tous de connaître le point de rupture des Sahraouis.

Combien de temps encore les réfugiés peuvent-il supporter de souffrir à Tindouf ? Le Front Polisario subit une intense pression pour reprendre la guerre, tandis que l’exploitation et la répression marocaine au Sahara occidental se poursuivent avec peu de protestations de la communauté internationale. Je crains que la situation ira en empirant avant que le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU ne décide de la prendre au sérieux.

Bio express

Spécialiste du Maghreb, Jacob Mundy anime actuellement un cours sur la paix et les conflits à l’université Colgate de New York. Il a particulièrement travaillé sur les conflits armés et les interventions humanitaires en Afrique du Nord, une région où il a séjourné de nombreuses fois.

Jacob Mundy a publié des articles très fouillés sur le conflit sahraoui dans plusieurs revues spécialisées. Le dernier remonte à 2014 et est intitulé Sahara occidental : La résistance non violente comme dernier recours. Il a été coécrit avec Stephen Zune. Jacob Mundy est diplômé des universités d’Exeter et de Seattle.

Zine Cherfaoui

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Guardian reviews Simon Brann Thorpe’s collection of photographs “Toy Soldiers,” with an introductory essay by Jacob Mundy

Toy Soldiers by Simon Brann Thorpe review – a powerful meditation on war
Sean O’Hagan
Sunday 28 June 2015

These images in which troops pose as their model counterparts show the absurdity of military conflict – and the plight of individuals locked in it

War photography might seem the least inappropriate genre to lend itself to a conceptual treatment, but artists as diverse as Sophie Ristelhueber and Broomberg and Chanarin have ruptured the traditional narrative of reportage in surprising ways. Ristelhueber’s series Fait, made in 1991, presents monochrome images of the scarred surface of the Kuwaiti desert seven months after the first Gulf war. Craters, tyre marks and pieces of machinery and uniforms are photographed alongside high aerial shots of roads and abandoned military posts, giving the impression of an alien planet denuded of life after an apocalyptic endgame.

British duo Broomberg and Chanarin opted for an even more conceptual response by exposing a long roll of film to sunlight each time someone died in Afghanistan while they were embedded there with British troops in 2008. Their bright abstractions of light on paper are perhaps the most absurdist response to both the horrors of war and the cliches of a certain kind of macho photojournalism.

Now comes Simon Brann Thorpe’s book Toy Soldiers, in which real soldiers pose in the exaggerated or static manner of their miniature model counterparts. That the conceit is not as daft in its execution as it sounds is down, to a great degree, to Thorpe’s meticulous approach – in which the distance between the real and the staged is blurred to surreal, slightly ominous effect. There is something deathlike in his portraits: one young soldier stands, eyes closed, as if asleep or hypnotised; another poses with his hands – and rifle – raised as if shot by a sniper. Throughout, the sand and sky provide a natural backdrop that amplifies the unrealness.

The context for Toy Soldiers is a long-running, overlooked conflict in Western Sahara, where nationalists have been fighting for independence from Morocco – which took control of the region from Spain in 1875 – for 40 years. What makes this liberation struggle unique in modern times is its relative decency. As academic and Middle East historian Jacob Mundy writes in his illuminating essay for the book: “Unlike other armed liberation movements in Africa and the Middle East, the Western Saharan nationalists… have denounced terrorism in all its forms and never engaged in it; their constitution calls for the creation of a secular, democratic, multi-party, free market republic after independence.”
Photograph by Simon Brann Thorpe.

For the project, Thorpe somehow convinced a military commander to allow his men to be the subjects of a conceptual experiment that has, at its heart, a critique of western post-colonial strategies – the UN security council backs Morocco and both America and France view the region as, in Mundy’s words, “a key vehicle for north Atlantic interests”. The soldiers, then, are caught in a struggle that has become a long stalemate and, as such, has lost the interest of global news media drawn to bigger, more potentially cataclysmic conflicts. In Thorpe’s photographs, they often look like small, lost figures in a vast, barren landscape, sometimes seen from a distance as kneeling, aiming silhouettes and sometimes arranged in long lines close to what look like miniature model buildings. Always, their feet are standing on flat, round bases just like toy soldiers, though these ones are made from compressed metal barrels. Their static poses, too, symbolise the bigger stasis, political and historical, in which they are caught.

The result is a series of images that show the absurdity of war, but also the plight of the individual soldier locked into a conflict that must seem endless. “It is difficult to look at Simon Brann Thorpe’s Toy Soldiers,” writes Mundy, “and not dwell on the powerful metaphor these photographs literally play with. Fighters in the Western Saharan liberation movement have become playthings. But whose toys are they, and what is the game being played?” These are the kinds of questions that echo through this odd, and oddly powerful, conceptual meditation on war – and war photography.

Toy Soldiers is published by Dewi Lewis (£35). Click here to buy it for £28

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Open Democracy on Véronique Dudouet’s “Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation”

When nonviolent action is the last resort
Brian Martin
27 May 2015
https://www.opendemocracy.net/civilresistance/brian-martin/when-nonviolent-action-is-last-resort

Against a repressive government, nonviolent action can often be more effective than violence. A new book surveys how the switch from armed to nonviolent resistance can occur. Book review.

Brigades of Zapatistas reconstruct school destroyed by paramilitary groups. Demotix/ Debora Poo Soto. All rights reserved. Brigades of Zapatistas reconstruct school destroyed by paramilitary groups. Demotix/ Debora Poo Soto. All rights reserved.Imagine that you live in a country with a repressive government, such as South Africa under apartheid or Burma under the generals. You are part of a resistance movement, seeking to overthrow the government or to obtain independence for your oppressed people. What is the best way to go about it? Diplomatic efforts, education, protest, noncooperation or armed struggle?

Research shows that a movement using primarily nonviolent action — methods such as rallies, strikes, boycotts and alternative government — is more likely to be effective than armed struggle. So you choose to join a nonviolent movement. So far so good. But there’s a complication. There’s already an active armed movement with the same goals as you, and you think this movement’s violent acts are hurting the resistance. The government calls them ‘terrorists’ and uses their violence as a pretext for arrests, torture, killing and removal of freedoms. Your nonviolent movement is paying part of the price. So you set yourself a task. You want to convince members of the armed opposition to switch to a strategy built around nonviolent action. How do you go about it?

If you are academically inclined, you should immediately consult a new book edited by Véronique Dudouet titled Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation (Routledge, 2015). The term ‘civil resistance’ means nonviolent action and ‘conflict transformation’ means changing the nature of the conflict from one form to another. The subtitle is more revealing: Transitions from armed to nonviolent struggle.

Dudouet has found authors to write on eight prominent contemporary cases in which movements have switched from armed to nonviolent methods: Western Sahara, West Papua, Palestine, South Africa, Chiapas, Colombia, Egypt and Nepal. Few of these stories are known to the wider public. Perhaps only the struggles in Palestine and South Africa are familiar through the mass media, and even in these cases the transition from armed to nonviolent methods is little known. So here is a valuable compendium of insights about a crucially important process that has escaped the notice of scholars and members of the public alike.

The first important insight is that nonviolent action can be a method of choice for resistance struggles. The usual assumption until now has been that armed struggle is a last resort, to be undertaken when other methods don’t work, or when the regime is so repressive that nonviolent action can’t possibly be successful. Throw this assumption out the window! A replacement assumption is that there is no such thing as a last resort, but instead that different approaches need to be examined on their merits in particular circumstances. Sometimes, indeed often, armed struggle fails and movements gain by shifting to nonviolent struggle. No doubt there are cases in which movements can benefit by shifting to conventional politics; they would be the topic for a different book.

The second insight from Dudouet’s book is that transitions from armed to nonviolent struggle are nearly always complex and messy. It’s possible to imagine a simple process in which activists sit down and say, “Our approach isn’t working. Let’s switch to one more likely to be effective.” Actually, a couple of the cases studies start something like this. In Egypt, the leaders of the Islamic Group (IG) decided to change their methods. However, they didn’t say this was because armed struggle wasn’t working. They actually provided sophisticated theological justifications. Furthermore, a movement doesn’t suddenly change its approach on the say-so of leaders. IG leaders embarked on a systematic process of talking to the rank and file, explaining and justifying their decision and eventually persuading most movement members.

However, this was just one of several paths to nonviolent struggle. In Mexico, the Zapatistas grew out of an armed movement and fully expected that when they launched the rebellion in Chiapas on 1 January 1994, people across the country would rise up and overthrow the Mexican government. Of course it didn’t happen. The Zapatistas received great support from within Chiapas and also, unexpectedly, from sympathisers throughout the world. Within a matter of days, pressures from the base — the people in Chiapas — pushed the Zapatistas to change to a nonviolent strategy: they retained their arms but did not use them.

What is striking in this case is the pragmatism of the Zapatistas: seeing the response of their local and international constituency, and the lack of a country-wide insurgency, they promptly jettisoned their beliefs about the necessity of armed struggle, grounded in Marxism-Leninism, and adopted beliefs grounded in nonviolent action and local empowerment.

As Guiomar Rovira Sancho, author of the chapter on the Zapatistas, puts it:

“The Zapatista uprising encountered immense support, which gave rise to an extensive solidarity network. It was evident that the armed strategy put all civil allies at risk and that, at the military level, the correlation of forces, once the moment of surprise was over, was totally negative for the EZLN. Their only way to survive was to take advantage of the support coming from civil society and to continue their struggle through negotiation and political means.” (p. 144)

Each case in Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation involves multiple players, a range of influences and varying strategies. In order to make some sense of this potentially confusing diversity, Dudouet asks each contributor to examine factors relevant to understanding the transition. At the level of the movement pushing for social change, two factors are the role of the leadership and the negotiations and struggles within the movement itself. At the level of society, factors include pressures from allies, the possibility of building coalitions, learning from campaigns by other groups, and competition with other movements. Then there are factors at the level of the country, such as state repression and inducement, and international factors, such as allies, emulation and acquisition of skills.

Each of the contributors followed this framework, with the result that the book as a whole has an exemplary level of coherence. If you are looking for an understanding of the transition dynamics in a particular country, such as West Papua or Nepal, you can turn to the relevant chapter. If you are looking to understand the transition process more generally, Dudouet’s introduction and conclusion serve as admirable guides.

In some cases, the actions of western governments have served to undermine transitions to unarmed resistance. The US government, for example, continued to classify groups in Egypt and Western Sahara as terrorist many years after they had rejected armed struggle. Dudouet, in drawing some conclusions, notes that policy-makers should better recognise the possibility of transitions and support them.

This, however, assumes that western governments actually prefer opposition movements to be nonviolent. If nonviolent movements are more effective, perhaps some governments intuitively prefer to provoke violence because this plays into the government’s hands, justifying its own superior violence and strengthening its grip on power. Although in some cases, most prominently South Africa, western governments supported a push for change, governments were often the last to join the campaign.

Perhaps in the future, when many more cases have been studied and frameworks for understanding transitions have been refined, there will be a simple guide on the vital topic of movements switching from armed to nonviolent strategies.

For now, Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation is the essential source. It shows that transforming conflicts towards nonviolent struggles is usually a complex and challenging process. Most importantly, it is possible.

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Hillary Clinton’s ties to Morocco’s phosphate industry and the implications for Western Sahara

Hillary Clinton, phosphates, and the Western Sahara
Stephen Zunes
May. 12, 2015

For more than a half-century, a series of United Nations resolutions and rulings by the International Court of Justice have underscored the rights of inhabitants of countries under colonial rule or foreign military occupation. Among these is the right to “freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources,” which “must be based on the principles of equality and of the right of peoples and nations to self-determination.”

As far back as 1962, the United Nations determined that “the right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned,” and “violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” This reflects the longstanding legal principle, reiterated subsequently by the General Assembly, that “the right of the peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories … to enjoyment of their natural resources and their right to dispose of those resources in their best interest.”

Similarly, a series of decisions by the International Court of Justice regarding Namibia, Nauru, East Timor and Palestine has further codified the rights of non-self-governing people to control over their own natural resources.

Perhaps the most serious contemporary violation of this longstanding international legal principle involves the nation of Western Sahara, the former Spanish colony invaded, occupied, and annexed by Morocco in 1975. Morocco has ignored a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions and a landmark World Court decision underscoring the right of the Western Saharan people — who are ethnically and linguistically distinct from most Moroccans — to self-determination. However, France and the United States, veto-wielding permanent members of that body and longstanding allies of Morocco, have blocked the United Nations from enforcing its resolutions.

The Moroccan government and its supporters point to the kingdom’s ambitious large-scale development projects in Western Sahara, particularly in urban areas. More than $2.5 billion has been poured into the territory’s infrastructure, significantly more than Morocco has procured from Western Sahara’s natural resources and more than they would likely obtain in the foreseeable future. For this reason, the regime’s supporters argue that they have fulfilled the requirements regarding interests, well-being, and development needs of the indigenous population.

However, most of the infrastructure development in the occupied territory has not been designed to enhance the standard of living of the Western Saharan people, but has instead involved the elaborate internal security system of military bases, police facilities, prisons, surveillance, and related repressive apparatuses; housing construction, subsidies, and other support for Moroccan settlers; and airport, seaport, and other transportation facilities designed to accelerate resource extraction. More fundamentally, the decisions on how to use the proceeds from the mines and fisheries are being made by the Moroccan government in the capital of Rabat, not by the subjugated population.

In 2002, then U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Hans Corell determined that the exploitation of natural resources in Western Sahara is a “violation of the international law principles applicable to mineral resource activities in Non-Self-Governing Territories.”

Unfortunately, this did not stop mining companies, oil companies, and fishing fleets from Morocco, Europe and the United States from effectively stealing from the people of Western Sahara — or from trying to influence political leaders.

For example, the Office Cherifien des Phosphates (OCP), a Moroccan government-owned mining company that controls one of the world’s largest phosphate mines in the occupied Western Sahara, is the primary donor to the Clinton Global Initiative conference last week in Marrakech. This and other support provided to the Clinton Foundation by OCP — now totaling as much as $5 million — has raised some eyebrows, given Hillary Clinton’s efforts as secretary of state to push the Obama administration to recognize Morocco’s illegal annexation of the territory through a dubious “autonomy” plan promoted by King Mohammed VI that would deny the people of Western Sahara the option of independence as international law requires.

About five years ago, opposition from Michael Posner, then assistant secretary of state for democracy and human rights, along with some key Democratic senators and members of the National Security Council convinced the White House to instead encourage further U.N.-led negotiations between Morocco and the Western Saharan government-in-exile, known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR.) The SADR has been recognized by scores of governments and is a full member state of the African Union, whose Peace and Security Council has called for a “global boycott of products of companies involved in the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of Western Sahara.”

Since leaving office, Hillary Clinton — now the leading candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination — has continued her outspoken support for the autocratic monarchy. When she announced the Marrakesh meeting last fall, she praised Morocco as a “vital hub for economic and cultural exchange,” thanking the regime “for welcoming us and for its hospitality.” A number of key supporters, such as attorney Justin Gray and former Congressman Toby Moffett, are registered lobbyists for the Moroccan regime.

This has not gone unnoticed on Capitol Hill. “You’ve heard of blood diamonds, but in many ways you could say that OCP is shipping blood phosphate,” Rep. Joe Pitts, R-Pa., said. “Western Sahara was taken over by Morocco to exploit its resources and this is one of the principal companies involved in that effort.”

Pitts and New Jersey Rep. Chris Smith, chair of the Human Rights Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, sent a letter to the Clinton Foundation, saying, “Out of respect for internationally recognized human rights norms, the Clinton Global Initiative should discontinue its coordination with OCP and return any accepted money from the enterprise.” The foundation did not respond.

As an attorney well-versed in international affairs, Clinton is no doubt aware of the legal and moral issues regarding the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara and the seeming impropriety of her foundation accepting money from a government-owned company illegally exploiting the natural resources of a non-self-governing territory.

That she is willing to do so anyway raises some troubling questions.

[Stephen Zunes is a professor of politics and program director of Middle Eastern studies at the University of San Francisco.]

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Review of Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s “The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam, and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival”

The Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam, and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2014, pp. 304

The Western Sahara refugees have been many things to many people. Some have described the Sahrawi camps as a revolutionary paradise where women have played a profound role in their nation’s political struggle for self-determination. For others, the Sahrawi refugees have been living in prison camps run by Marxist revolutionaries supported by Algeria. These camps were formed in the wake of Morocco’s 1975 invasion of the Spanish Sahara and today are home to some 100,000 to 160,000 refugees (even the camps’ population is highly contested). Even with the Internet and cell phones now available in the camps, as well as a significant international presence of aid workers and activists, the realities of life in the camps remain subject to intensely contested counter-representations. With the rise of armed Islamist groups in the central Sahara and the 2012 conflict in Mali, speculation surrounding these camps has reached an all-time high. Since 9/11, Morocco and its lobbyists in the United States—among the top ten most well funded in Washington—have ceaselessly insinuated connections between the Sahrawi refugees and Al-Qaida’s northwest African affiliates. The question of Western Sahara’s independence—and thus the fate of the Sahrawi refugees—is now so tangled in the broader question of trans-Saharan security and African “failed states” that the refugees’ rights and dignity are being displaced by wild speculation about their religious and political radicalization.

In this context, Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s Ideal Refugees: Gender, Islam, and the Sahrawi Politics of Survival arrives perhaps at just the right time to provide sober observations on the realities of camp life for the Sahrawis. Based upon several visits to the camps and interviews with Sahrawi refugees in a number of other locations (e.g., Syria, Cuba, and South Africa), Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s fundamental conclusion is quite simple: representations of Sahrawi refugees have been over-determined by the politics of those claiming to act on the refugees’ behalf or in solidarity with them.

The Ideal Refugees rightfully avoids engaging with the most histrionic claims about the refugees, particularly the unfounded claims of Islamist radicalization in the camps. Instead, the book examines other widespread claims about the Sahrawi refugees, particularly reports about the exceptional nature of their political community, gender relations, and practice of Islam. These “ideal” claims are the subject of Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s book.

Over the course of several decades, the idealness of the Sahrawi refugees has been constructed through comparisons with “bad” African and Arab liberation movements (particularly those that lapsed into terrorism), with stereotypical images of women’s repression in Muslim majority societies, and with the rise of armed Islamic fundamentalism across Asia and Africa. The method of analysis used in The Ideal Refugees is to marry interview and other observational data with documentary research. In each case, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh questions the origins of these ideal claims. It is little surprise that she finds things are not as ideal as alleged in politics, gender, and Islam in the camps. These findings are then positioned within currents in post-colonial and post-structuralist feminist theory, as well as the practical dilemmas of internationally managing prolonged exile.

Many historical and contingent factors led to the Western Saharan refugees becoming “ideal,” particularly the propaganda war between Morocco and the Sahrawi nationalists. But the most tantalizing element of Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s story are the ways in which Spanish solidarity actors have been part of the refugees’ idealization. The refugees’ ideal performances are done for the sake of, notably, a kind of solidarity tourist who visits the camps for no more than days or weeks at a time or to help maintain increasing interpersonal connections with specific refugees and host families in Spain. These acts of solidarity are predicated upon, and so artificially perpetuate, those core ideal images of the refugees as politically progressive, religiously moderate, and socially egalitarian. The maintenance of these ideal images, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh argues, ultimately masks questionable relations of power in the camps. Solidarity actors are not only blind to these relations but they are haphazardly complicit with them. The result is solidarity that does much to maintain what is, for Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, a longstanding and problematic regime of power in the camps.

The Ideal Refugees unfortunately stops well short of connecting its examination—failed Spanish solidarity and Polisario’s questionable refugee management—with the broader geopolitics of the issue. The bulk of Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s critique is aimed at Polisario and solidarity activists for failing the refugees as refugees. Little is said about the international community’s failure to respect Western Sahara’s fundamental right to self-determination, which was upheld by the International Court of Justice in 1975 and is the basis for UN Security Council engagement with the issue since 1991. A more powerful critique would have extended the initial conclusions in The Ideal Refugees to examine how transnational refugee solidarity and support networks actually help maintain prolonged exile by collaborating unwittingly with geopolitical power. For example, one of the strangest features of the Western Sahara conflict has been the ambivalence of Spain. Though Spanish civil society overwhelmingly supports the rights and independence of its former colony (and shows that support through refugee support), Spanish government policy on the issue has been largely unaffected. Madrid has simply followed France and the United States. Their support for Morocco’s illegal occupation of the Sahrawi homeland is largely for the sake of the Moroccan monarchy’s stability, which is now tied to the conquest and annexation of Western Sahara. No one has yet sufficiently explained this paradox of massive Spanish solidarity with the Sahrawis while the state continues to back Morocco.

That The Ideal Refugees does not make these connections is surprising, given the intellectual tradition of feminist anti-imperialism it claims to follow. The power of gendered analysis was never simply its ability to re-describe quotidian realities. The power of such analysis rested in its ability to elucidate the simultaneous operations of power at multiple levels of analysis in ways largely invisible to mainstream forms of implicitly masculinist and deterministic top-down analysis. The great tradition of post-colonial feminist understandings has always demonstrated the ways in which geopolitical power operates upon and through gendered relations at the most intimate levels of subjective human experience. Towering figures like Cynthia Enloe, Lila Abu-Lughod, Liisa Malkki, and Marnia Lazreg revolutionized international relations, refugee studies, and Middle East studies by doing exactly this; that is, by transforming ethnographic thick description into a tool that could account for the manifold local, regional, and global forces that constrain and enable particular manifestations of gendered relations, including resistance to those forces.

The Ideal Refugees claims to make gender visible in the politics of Sahrawi refugee survival, but it does so at the expense of making the geopolitical conditions of the Sahrawis’ dispossession, exile, and brute refugeeness invisible. In The Ideal Refugees, the invisibility of the larger forces acting upon the Sahrawi refugees is evidenced in the fact that France and the United States, the two states that have done the most to determine the lives of Sahrawis through their support of Morocco on the UN Security Council, are mentioned so rarely as to be omitted from the book’s index. The connections between the conflict’s “high” politics of international diplomacy and the “low” politics of refugee survival are plainly obvious to most dedicated observers of the conflict. But all we get in The Ideal Refugees is the low politics of camp life vis-à-vis the entrenched rule of Polisario and the naiveté of solidarity activists.

The ironic fact of The Ideal Refugees is that, for all its effort to position itself within post-structural and post-colonial feminist theory, it is difficult not to see it as a refugee expert explaining how brown men use and abuse brown women. As Spivak’s much-cited critique of British colonialism noted, the civilizing mission of imperialism was often predicated on a need to save black and brown women from black and brown men. The Ideal Refugees oddly reconfigures this colonial politics of representation and salvation for the post-imperial, post-ideological world. Thus the theoretical irony of The Ideal Refugees is matched by an ethical one as well. Though The Ideal Refugees claims to use ethnographic methods, it fails to apply the hard-won lessons of post-colonial ethnography. Having been deeply complicit in European colonialism, critical anthropologists recognized the need for ethnography to disavow and disassociate itself from colonial governmentality’s efforts to scientifically manage the Other.

Much of the research behind The Ideal Refugees stems from prior research projects aimed at improving the scientific management of refugees, one of the contemporary world’s most important bio-political Others. The argument and conclusion of The Ideal Refugees is thus an intellectual defence of the mission civilisatrice behind today’s international regime of refugee science and refugee management. The Ideal Refugees not only fails to account for the actual politics of Sahrawi survival, it fails to recognize its embeddedness within the anti-politics of neo-liberal governmentality. The result is a study that is neither enlightening nor emancipatory.
The Ideal Refugees’ lack of reflexivity, apart from some caveats on field research and ethics, can therefore be attributed to the dominance of its managerial impulses over its ethnographic ones. Here the problematization of the refugee begins not with the geopolitical fact of the refugee or the camp but with the bio-political imperative to understand and manage them only as refugees. Thus questions are never directed at (1) the broader conditions of the refugees’ possibility; (2) the processes that have led to their reification as a consistent thing and as a persistent problem; or (3) the role of the refugee expert in these conditions and processes.
This suggests that the contemporary problem of the refugee and the camp cannot be sufficiently understood through either a paternalistic analysis of camp life or an emancipatory critique of the geopolitical conditions of exile. The contemporary problem of the refugee can be understood only if we also examine those stakeholders who have the most invested in the maintenance of refugees and refugee camps—that is, the refugee expert. In much the same way that we can today use colonial ethnography to shed light on the logic and operations of European imperial power in the past, The Ideal Refugees sheds much light on the contemporary discourse of refugee expertise and its articulation within the logics and operations of post-imperial power in the present.
Jacob Mundy is an assistant professor of peace and conflict studies at Colgate University, where he also contributes to African and Middle Eastern studies. His monograph Imaginative Geographies of Algerian Violence: Conflict Science, Conflict Management, Antipolitics will be published by Stanford University Press later this year. The author may be contacted at jmundy@colgate.edu.

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Washington Post article and video on struggle of Western Sahara’s refugees

Could war come back to Western Sahara? Some of Algeria’s Sahrawi refugees think so
By Whitney Shefte
December 31, 2014

Tumana Ahmed is tired of dreaming of a homeland she has never seen.

The 28-year-old was born in the desolate desert of western Algeria, in a refugee camp that was supposed to be temporary. Only there has been nothing temporary about her situation, or that of about 150,000 of her current neighbors.

Ahmed’s family and thousands of others fled their homeland of Western Sahara, a territory bordering Algeria that is about the size of New Zealand, after Morocco annexed the territory in 1975. Nearly 40 years later, the families still have not returned.

Morocco and Western Sahara engaged in armed conflict until 1991, when the United Nations brokered a cease-fire. As part of the deal, Morocco was supposed to conduct a referendum for Sahrawis to decide whether they wanted to be part of an independent nation or remain under Moroccan rule. But that referendum still hasn’t happened. Many Sahrawis worry that without a return to armed conflict, the referendum may never happen.

“For me, I think there is only two solutions,” Ahmed said. “We go to the borders, fight, make war, which is not the best solution. And the other solution, which is self-determination, this is the best one. Just let us vote. Is Morocco afraid of something?”

Tumana Ahmed, right, a Sahrawi refugee living in camps in Algeria, speaks with a fellow refugee after prayers on Oct. 8, 2013. Ahmed was born in the camps, which are in the western part of the country near the city of Tindouf, and she has never traveled to Western Sahara. (Whitney Shefte/The Washington Post)

Leaders of the Sahrawi resistance movement who govern the camps encourage Sahrawi youths to be patient.

“We’re still believing in peace, and we’re still believing that United Nations is able to do something,” said M’hamed Khadad, the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) coordinator for the Polisario Front, the resistance movement. “But they are in need really to push this thing hard because you cannot really control the feeling and the sentiment of people.” He noted that 60 percent of the people in the camp are youths, many of them born after the cease-fire.

MINURSO workers in Western Sahara spend their time monitoring the cease-fire. There have been efforts from time to time to hold a referendum, but the Moroccan government and the Polisario Front cannot agree on who should be considered eligible to vote. And some Sahrawis want to remain under Moroccan rule.

“It’s problematic,” said Hajbouha Zoubir, a Sahrawi who works for the Moroccan Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs.

In October 2013, Sahrawis in the Dakhla refugee camp reenacted the 2010 Gdeim Izik protest that took place outside Laayoune, Western Sahara. During the Gdeim Izik protest, thousands of Sahrawis erected tents in the desert in protest of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara and a lack of jobs and limited freedom of speech in the territory. The camp was violently dismantled, with Moroccan police and protesters clashing. (Whitney Shefte/The Washington Post)

After Morocco invaded Western Sahara, the kingdom offered thousands of Moroccans tax breaks to move into the territory. It’s thought that Moroccans now outnumber Sahrawis by at least 2 to 1 in Western Sahara, which has a population of about 500,000. And Morocco argues that Algerians have populated the Polisario-run refugee camps. Representatives of the Polisario — which is backed by Algeria — deny this.

Morocco also claims that Western Sahara, which is rich in fisheries and phosphate mines, was part of Morocco long before the Spanish ruled the territory from 1884 until 1975 and that Morocco thus has a right to the land. In fact, Berber tribes mostly populated the region before Spanish rule, at one point forming the Almoravid dynasty, whose rule included both Morocco and Western Sahara. The International Court of Justice ruled that indigenous Sahrawis have sovereignty over Western Sahara – not Morocco.

“Mainly it’s become part of the national ideology in Morocco that Western Sahara is part of the territory,” said Jacob Mundy, assistant professor of peace and conflict studies at Colgate University. “It’s viewed as being historically part of Morocco, and today the nation obviously benefits from the occupation in terms of certain mineral wealth and other sorts of things.” For the current Moroccan government, he said, “one of the pillars of its legitimacy is the continued control over Western Sahara and the hope for the eventual legal annexation in the international community’s eyes.”

Most nations, including the United States, do not recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. But France — a member of the U.N. Security Council — has defended Morocco.

“Conflicts like this where the big boys are involved — the big boys being the permanent five members of the Security Council — can be incredibly difficult to resolve,” Mundy said. “So while there is overwhelming international consensus that Western Sahara is owed some act of self-determination … there’s no will from the Security Council to really push this conflict in any direction that would otherwise upset what is a real, kind of delicate balance of interest.”

This reality is something that Ahmed has come to understand, which is why she says a return to war may be the only way she’ll ever see her family’s homeland.

Learn more about the conflict between Western Sahara and Morocco by watching this video.

This story was made possible with support from the International Women’s Media Foundation.