[Note: The following was sent to Middle East Quarterly on November 19, 2009. Judy Goodrobb, MEQ’s managing editor, sent me a revised — abbreviated — version of this letter for publication on January 19, 2010. The same day, I sent it back with some minor additions to the revisions and approved it for publication. As of March 2011, it has yet to appear on the Middle East Forum website. The semi-anonymous blogger Chasli at Western Sahara Endgame also took on Spector’s MEQ article in April 2010.]
19 November 2009,
To the editor:
The small group of scholars (and even smaller group of policy makers) interested in Western Sahara always appreciate new contributions to the discourse. However, they should at least be based in fact. Samuel J Spector’s article ‘Western Sahara and the Self-Determination Debate’ (Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2009, pp. 33-43) unfortunately fails this preliminary test.
The most important feature of the Western Sahara dispute that many observers confuse is the relationship between Spain’s departure from the territory and the joint Moroccan-Mauritanian take-over (though Mauritania left in 1979). Spector initially suggests that when Spain left, Rabat and Nouakchott jumped in to fill the void; he later contradicts himself. The full story, however, is worth sketching out, as it has serious implications.
Morocco’s military invasion of the territory commenced on 30-31 October 1975 in secret, followed several days later by the well known, yet ultimately symbolic, ‘Green March’ of 350,000 Moroccans across the border between Spanish Sahara on 6 November (only a few thousand made the crossing and quickly turned back).
It was Morocco’s threat of invasion (announced hours after The Hague called for Spanish Sahara’s self-determination) that forced the divided Spanish cabinet into negotiations that led to a tripartite agreement between Morocco, Mauritania and Spain on 14 November. The final Spanish withdrawal did not take place until February 1976. By that time, Moroccan and Mauritanian forces were already heavily engaged with the fighters of the Polisario independence movement fighters.
Morocco’s aggressive occupation of Western Sahara is not only a violation of the territory’s right to self-determination under the laws of Non-Self-Governing territories, it is a fundamental violation of the UN Charter’s prohibition against the expansion of territory by force.
A key fact Spector omits is how the ICJ came to its determination that Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the time of Spanish colonization in 1884-5. The court found that Western Sahara was ‘inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them’. In other words, Western Sahara belonged to the Western Saharans. In fact, Morocco’s case for historical sovereignty over Western Sahara was so weak that the Court felt that ‘there was no effective and continuous display of State functions even in those areas to the north of Western Sahara’.
So why did Morocco invade Western Sahara in 1975? Pure and simple, the people would have voted — and likely still would vote — for independence and not for integration with Morocco. Whatever the opinion of the ICJ, Spain had already announced in early October 1975 that it would hold a self-determination referendum. A UN visiting mission, which had toured Spanish Sahara in mid-1975, claimed that the territory overwhelmingly favoured independence.
How do we still know that the native people of Western Sahara would opt for independence? Because Morocco still refuses to allow a referendum on independence. In 2003, Polisario even agreed to allow Moroccan settlers in Western Sahara — who outnumber natives by at least two-to-one — to participate in a referendum so long as independence is an option. Morocco still refused ‘on principle’ to have its sovereignty questioned. Yet no country, to date, recognizes Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. And one has to ask, Why would Morocco reject a referendum dominated by Moroccans?
Many who oppose self-determination point to a slippery slope of a thousand secessionist movements and unmanageable microstates. Yet the detractors of self-determination forget the Pandora’s Box of irredentism. The legal regime that guided the decolonization of a billion people in the twentieth century by strictly maintaining ‘arbitrary yet sacrosanct’ colonial borders was not simply high minded Wilsonian idealism. It also had a clear pragmatic rationale: to prevent exactly what has happened in the case of Western Sahara.
For all his legal contortions, Spector fails to confront the very simple question: What do the people of Western Sahara want?
The Western Sahara issue could be closed tomorrow if Morocco allowed the UN to hold the long delayed referendum. Polisario has agreed to a referendum allowing the choices of (a) independence, (b) integration with Morocco or (c) special autonomous status (perhaps based upon Morocco’s 2007 proposal or James Baker’s 2003 proposal). So what is the hold up? The problem is not self-determination; the problem is that Morocco will not leave and the Security Council — France and the United States — will not put even the slightest amount of pressure on Morocco. Until the Security Council confronts the inconvenient truth that most Western Saharans would prefer independence over Moroccan occupation and colonization, this conflict will persist no matter how we define self-determination.
Sincerely,
Jacob Mundy
PhD Candidate
Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies
University of Exeter